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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRED BUTZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. Case No. 
7441 
UNION P ACIFI·C RAILRO,AD COM-
pANY, a corporation, ~ 
Defendant and Respondent. ~ 
( 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PE·TITION FOR REHEARING 
Union Pacific Railroad ·Company, res·pondent, respect; 
fully petitions the above entitled court for a rehearing in 
the above case for the following reason: 
The Supreme Court erred in holding that this case 
should be submitted to a jury for determination for the 
reason that the evidence was wholly insufficient to present 
a jury question on the issue of the defendant's negligence. 
BR~AN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. ·C·ORAY, 
. D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Respondent, 
UNION P A:CIFI'C RAILROAD COMPANY. 
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CER'T'IFIC'ATE 
Howard F. Coray, one of the attorneys for the respon-
dent Union Pacific Railroad Company, hereby certifies 
that the above and foregoing petition for rehearing is made 
in good faith and not for any purpose of delaying the course 
of the proceedings in the above entitled cause, and that in 
his opinion there is good reason to believe that the judg-
ment and opinion of this court rendered in the above en-
titled cause is erroneous, and that in his opinion said cause 
ought to be re-examined. 
HOWARD F. CORAY. 
BRIEF 
THE SUPREME CO·URT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT THIS. CASE SHOULD BE SUBMITTE·D 
TO A JURY FOR DETERMINATION FOR T'HE 
REASON T'HAT T'HE EVIDENC·E WAS WH·OL-
LY INSUFFICIENT TO PRESENT A JURY 
QUESTTON ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFEN-
DANT'S NEGLIGEN~CE. 
At the outset we wish to make it clear that we have 
no quarrel with the general principles of law relied upon 
by the majority of this court in arriving at the result 
reached in the opinion written in this cause. But we earn-
estly contend that the court erred in applying these princi-
ples to the facts in the case at bar, with an erroneous con-
clusion as the result. 
·Careful examination of this court's opinion leads us 
to the conclusion that the essence of the decision of the 
majority of the court that a jury question on the issue of 
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negligence is presented is to be found in the following para-
graph of the opinion : 
"We appreciate that to apply the rule, 'further 
precautions ~rere possible,' literally, is not sound 
because there is no conceivable injury which by 
hindsight could not have been prevented by some 
precaution. The test is not "\Vhether afterward one 
may see a way that the injury could have been pre-
vented, but whether the railroad in the exercise of 
ordinary prudence and care should have reasonably 
foreseen the likelihood of injury. Under the cir-
cumstances of the instant case, this is a 1natter upon 
which reasonable minds could well differ. 'Vhether 
additional precautions should have been taken by the 
defendant to provide him with a safe place to work 
\Yas therefore a question for the jury." 
But the plaintiff in this case charged the defendant 
with negligence in paragraph VII of his complaint, as fol-
lows: 
"That the· defendant was negligent, careless, 
heedless and reckless at the time and place afore-
said in the following particulars : 
"(a) That defendant, well knowing that 
switchmen and other of defendant's employees in the 
ordinary, customary and usual course of their em-
ployment were required to and did ride engines and 
cars in a westerly direction along the outside bag-
gage track while stationed on the north side of such 
equipment and well knowing that such employees 
were likely to be placed in a dangerous and hazar-
dous position if baggage trucks and other equipment 
were left standing on said platform so near to the 
rail side thereof as to impair clearance between said 
trucks and engines or cars passing said platform 
on said baggage track, nevertheless· negligently, care-
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lessly and recklessly left not less than ten baggage 
trucks along the said platform in a position so near 
the north rail of the outside baggage track as to ma-
terially impair said clearance and to thus endanger 
men riding on the north side of cars moving in a 
westerly direction on said track; that as a result of 
said negligent and careless conduct, plaintiff, while 
stationed on the north side of a car moving by said 
platform, due to the inadequate and insufficient 
clearance between said baggage trucks and the side 
of said car, was carried into violent contact with 
said baggage trucks and caused to suffer the griev-
ous personal injuries, loss and damage herein com-
plained of." 
No other grounds of negligence have ever been charged 
against the defendant by any pleading in this case. It now 
appears that this court has decided that the case should 
·be submitted to a jury for determination on a theory of 
negligence absolutely foreign to that charged. 
The negligence charged by the complaint consists of 
conduct of the defendant in allegedly leaving ten baggage 
trucks along the platform in such a position as to impair 
clearance. The negligence which this court now states may 
be the basis of a verdict for the plaintiff is a failure to 
take further and additional precautions to protect the plain-
tiff against misfeasance of strangers. If this case were 
to be tried anew on the pleadings filed, it would be im-
proper for the trial couri to submit the case to the jury 
on the theory of negligence now outlined by this court 
because such theory of negligence has never been pleaded 
by this plaintiff. We are therefore at a loss to understand 
how the trial court can have erred in failing to submit the 
case to the jury on the theory of negligence now suggested 
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by this court, since that theory was never before the trial 
court for consideration under the pleadings. We have 
been appreciative of the fact that modern pleading does, not 
require the same particularity and specific detail as was 
required at common law; but it is a disturbing experience 
to discover that a complaint which charges negligence, 
consisting of affirmative misconduct in leaving objects 
fouling the track, will be held to support a finding that the 
defendant is guilty of negligence consisting of a failure 
to take additional precautions to protect a plaintiff against 
misconduct of third persons. The impropriety of submitting 
a case to a jury for a possible finding of negligence on a 
theory of negligence not charged is patent, and we do not 
propose to belabor the point further. 
But the most serious criticism which we think may 
fairly be leveled against the opinion of the court is that 
it misapplies the law to the facts of the case and thereby 
countenances a finding of negligence against the defendant 
under a fact situation where such finding is unreasonable 
and contrary to recognized authoritative decisions of this 
and other courts. The opinion of this court holds 
1
that a 
jury might find that the railroad in the exercise of ordinary 
prudence and care should have reasonably foreseen the like-
lihood of injury in the situation presented on the day of the 
accident and, consequently, that a jury might find that 
additional precautions should have been taken by the de-
fendant to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work. The 
evidence in the case at bar did not establish by proof the 
fact that the defendant had knowledge that the place of 
work to which Butz was assigned was unsafe, nor was 
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there any proof of circumstances indicating that the de-
fendant should have known of the dangerous condition of 
the place of work which actually existed. No evidence in 
the record indicates that the situation presented on the 
day of Butz' injury had ever occurred before, or that there 
was any reason for the defendant to anticipate that em-
ployes. of other companies would make the place of work 
unsafe by leaving baggage trucks foul of the tracks. It 
therefore would seem that to permit a jury to find that 
the railroad company should have foreseen the situation 
which existed on the day of the accident is. stretching the 
concept of foreseeability beyond its usual limits. But, even 
if it is proper to hold that the railroad company should 
be expected to foresee that objects would be left foul of 
the track, the taking of the further step in requiring the 
defendant to foresee that the plaintiff would ride the cars 
into collision with such objects on a train moving at a speed 
of approximately 5 miles per hour, in broad daylight, goes 
beyond any notion of reasonable foreseeability and requires 
of the defendant a type of foresight which is superior to 
that exercised by a fortune teller looking into a crystal ball. 
The evidence revealed without dispute that it was plain-
tiff's express duty to· discover any possible obstructions in 
the path of the train and to avoid colliding with the same. 
In this connection plaintiff testified as follows·: 
"Q. Now you are riding on the front end of 
this car for what purpose, Mr. Butz? 
"A. Why to protect the equipment I have ahold 
of and also to see that we have clear going; to see 
that -there ain't anybody going to walk across from 
the other side in .front of them. cars, or maybe there 
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would be somebody walking on this side and wouldn't 
hear us coming and be too close to the track where 
I would call his attention and if I couldn't call his 
attention, give the sign to stop and the last thing I 
have done-I have taken hold of people and grabbed 
them so they would clear as long as I have railroaded. 
"Q. So one of your primary duties is to keep a 
lookout ahead of the movement of trains; to see what 
obstacles there would be in front of it? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. And you are particularly interested and it 
is part of your duty, isn't it Mr. Butz, to observe any 
objects that are fouling the appearance (clearance) 
of the track? 
"A. y . es, sir. 
"Q. And that is the main reason you are riding 
there, isn't it? 
"A. Yes, sir, to see that everything is in the 
clear. 
"Q. That is right, and isn't it a fact, Mr. Butz, 
that every man on that crew-that is, the engineer, 
the fireman, the foreman, and the pin puller are re-
lying upon you primarily to see whether or not the 
track is clear ahead? 
"A. They don't just exactly rely on me. Why 
if you would have a hold of about ten or fifteen cars 
do you think he would look way up there that ten 
or fifteen cars and see what I would do up there? 
He would pay attention to the man that was. next to 
him. 
"Q. I understand, but the means by which the 
man next to him would give the engineer signals 
ordinarily by repeating the signal which you would 
give. Isn't that right? 
"A. Yes, if I would give the signal this man 
would repeat it to the engineer. 
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"Q. That is right, so wouldn't you say, Mr. 
Butz, this is a fair statement--every man on the 
crew was relying primarily on the lookout which 
you would keep ahead and the signals which you 
would give after making such observations as you 
did? 
"A. Yes, sure. 
"Q. So if there had been somebody standing 
on the track they would have counted on you to give 
the proper signal? 
"A. Certainly. That is what I would have done 
if I had seen a man in time ahead of me. 
"Q. I understand. If there was an engine com-
ing in the opposite direction they would primarily 
count on you to observe that and do the proper thing, 
isn't that right, Mr. Butz? 
"A. That is right. 
"Q. You, in effect, were the eyes of that crew 
to as·certain the condition of that track ahead, weren't 
you Mr. Butz? 
"A. Yes, si·r" ( R. 96-98) . 
Therefore, the net result of the court's opinion is a holding 
that the railroad company should foresee that the plaintiff 
would fail to discharge his positive duty and may be found 
guilty of negligence by reason of its failure to anticipa.te 
brea·ch of duty on the part of the plaintiff and its failure 
to guard against such misconduct on his part. We respect-
fully submit that reason cannot support such a conclusion. 
Neither can such a conclusion be supported by resort to 
the opinions of courts which have been confronted with 
similar situations. In the case of Lasagru:t v. M c·Cartky, 111 
Utah 2.H9, 177 P. 2d 734, Mr. Justice Latimer, speaking for 
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the court and quoting with approval from the case of 
Hardy v. Shedden Co., Ltd., said: 
"But where, in the course of the employment, the 
acts of third persons, not employed by the master, 
may increase the danger of the service, and these 
acts and their character are under the eye of the 
servant, and, to the servant's knowledge, are not 
under the supervision of the master, we do not think 
the master is liable if injury results to the servant 
from the negligence of the third persons * * * 
Where the servant * * * has greater opportun-
ity than the master to know and observe the prob-
able results from the acts of the third person, of 
which the master, to the knowledge of the servant, 
has had no opportunity to judge, then it is unreason-
able to hold that, with respect to such acts, the maste·r 
has any obligation to the servant * * * ." 
The conclusion reached in the case at bar is not consistent 
with the foregoing statement of this court. Negligence is 
defined by this court in the Lasagna case as "the omission 
to do something which a reasonable person, guided by those 
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
human affairs would do : Or the doing of something which 
a prudent person under like circumstances would not do." 
A reasonable person presented with the situation which 
existed on the day when Butz was injured, if guided by 
those cons.iderations which ordinarily regulate the conduct 
of human affairs, could not reasonably be expected to fore-
see that strangers would make the place of work of the 
plaintiff unsafe and, especially, that the plaintiff himself 
would fail to discharge his positive duty to avoid the very 
thing. which occurred. The bare possibility that this unusual 
chain of circumstances would occur was not a. sufficient 
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probability that reasonable persons would foresee its occur-
rence. 
In the case of Atlantic Coast R. R. Co. v. Craven, 185 
F. 2d 176, decided November 9, 1950, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of the plain-
tiff upon a jury verdict, with instructions to enter judg-
ment for the defendant railroad as a matter of law. In this 
suit, which was brought under the Federal Employers.' Lia-
bility Act, the plaintiff charged the defendant railroad with 
negligence in maintaining a yard fraught with unnecessary 
danger, in that the company had failed to provide plaintiff 
with a method to cross over track along which a train was 
moving without the necessity of climbing over the moving 
cars. The court made the following observations concerning 
liability under the federal act: 
"Under the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act, 
the common-law rule of ordinary prudence main-
tains, and a railroad is not necessarily required to 
employ the latest or the safest devices * * * 
We do not see how ordinary prudence could have 
required the construction of a bridge or a tunnel, 
or the disruption of the railroad's activities sug-
gested by the plaintiff. That remedy would have 
been all out of proportion to the risk involved. The 
remedy was with plaintiff, and lay n1erely in the 
exercise of that standard of personal safety that he 
had been instructed to use. * * * It would 
have been unreasonable to expect the railroad to 
take those extreme n1easures necessary to remove 
this slight danger. The railroad's duty would extend 
to the removal of all dangers reasonably to be an-
ticipated as an incident of plaintiff's employment 
but this duty was fulfilled when the railroad had 
defined the dangers to plaintiff and instructed him 
how to a void them." 
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Certainly, the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the case 
of Kloet.zer v. LouisviUe & Nashville R. R. Co., 95 N. E. 2d 
502, cited in Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion, was at least 
as foreseeable, as 'vas the injury to the plaintiff in the 
case at bar. In that case the place of "rork to which J(loetzer 
was assigned "·as unsafe, in that a baggage truck had been 
placed foul of the track along which a train was traveling. 
'Yhen the train struck the baggage truck the inevitable 
result 'vas that the baggage truck was violently propelled 
along a concrete platform where men were working. Yet, 
the Illinois court held that no evidence of negligence on 
the part of the defendant which employed the plaintiff had 
been shown by the evidence and denied liability. In the 
Kloetzer case the plaintiffhad no duties in connection with 
protecting against the type of accident which occurred, so 
that it was not necessary to require of the railroad that it 
foresee misconduct on Kloetzer's part to sustain the con-
clusion that the accident should have been foreseen and 
avoided by Kloetzer's employer. We therefore believe that 
the Kloetzer case was a much more favorable case for the 
plaintiff than is the case at bar, but, even there, the court 
ruled against the plaintiff as a rnatter of law. In the case of 
Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co·. v. LaVelle, 26'0 S. W. 2.48, in an 
almost identical situation, the T'exas courts stated: 
"And clearly the railway company on this par-
ticular case was not called upon 'to prevent' the 
'placing' of the skid poles for the purpose of unload-
ing logs; for in the circumstances, the appellant had 
no reasonable grounds to anticipate that the employ-
ees of the Veneer Works would do the very act on 
this special occasion of leaving the skid poles so near 
the cars. It is a plain and well established rule of 
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law that a railway company, like any other, is not 
liable for injuries caused solely by the act of strang-
ers putting a temporary obstruction on or danger-
ously near its. premises, unless it also is guilty of 
negligence." 
In our principal brief we urged that the defendant was 
not negligent because it had no notice, either actual or con-
structive, of the fact that a dangerous condition of the 
place of work to which Butz was assigned existed. The 
cases which we cited support that proposition. If such 
knowledge, either actual or constructive, is shown to exist, 
then there is reasonable basis for requiring the railroad 
company to foresee and anticipate an accident which may 
result therefrom. But the corollary of this proposition 
should likewise be true, i. e. : In the absence of knowledge, 
either actual or constructive, of such dangerous condition 
of the premises it is improper and unreasonable to expect 
the railroad company to foresee that an accident will occur. 
The factor which justifies a court or jury in arriving at 
the ·conclusion that an accident, which is the subject of a 
suit, was reasonably foreseeable in advance is the knowl-
edge, either actual or constructive, on the part of the de-
fendant of the danger which existed. In the absence of 
knowledge or notice of danger, foreseeability of injury 
simply cannot be found to exist upon any rational basis. 
As stated by this court in its opinion, it is not un-
reasonable to require the employer to exercise reasonable 
care. to make safe the place of work of its employes, whether 
on premises of the employer or on premises of a stranger. 
Nor is it unreasonable to require an employer to exercise 
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reasonable care at all times to discover whether or not the 
place of work is safe, but it is unreasonable to require of 
the employer that he foresee danger in a normally safe 
place of work such as. existed in the case at bar and to re-
quire of such employer that he take "additional precautions" 
to eliminate a danger which there was no reason to suspect 
existed. At page 2 of the opinion this court suggests that 
due care required of the defendant that certain additional 
precautions be taken in addition to those which were used. 
Plaintiff has never alleged a failure to take such further 
precautions as an act of negligence on the part of the de-
fendant, nor has the plaintiff alleged what further pre-
cautions on the part of the railroad company were required 
to satisfy the concept of "due care." This court did not 
say what precautions could or should have been taken. As 
was stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion, 
there was nothing structurally wrong with the track and 
nothing ·inherently dangerous in the physical layout of the 
yard. Under these circumstances, the probability of injury 
hardly justified or required extraordinary, and as yet, un-
specified steps by the defendant to prevent an accident. 
If the individuals in charge of the railroad company's 
operations at Denver should. foresee an accident from the 
car movement that was in progress when Butz was injured, 
then they should foresee an accident on any car movement 
into an inhabited area, even if a man rides the "point" of 
the cars with the positive duty of acting as a lookout for 
the train crew to avoid possible accidents. 
We therefore request that this court re-examine the 
facts of this case and reconsider the question as to whether 
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or not the evidence presented brings the case fairly within 
the legal principles announced by the court, i. e. : Whether 
or not this accident was reasonably foreseeable in ad.vance 
of the event. We believe that such a re-examination will 
result in a conclusion that error has been committed in 
holding that the plaintiff made a case sufficient to be sub-
mitted to a jury on the issue of the defendant's negligence. 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. C'ORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for Resp·ondent, 
UNION P A1CIFI;C RAILROAD C'OMP ANY. 
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